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THE EFFECT OF LARCENY BY TRICK UPON THE
PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE
FACTORS ACTS
T HE owner of merchandise, desirous of having it sold,
delivers it to another person intending that he find a
customer. This man pledges the merchandise and absconds
with the proceeds. At common law the pledgee obtained no
lien.1 Under the Factors Act the pledgee is protected to
the extent of his advances if these are made in good faith. 2
But if at the time the wrong-doer obtained possession he
had already formed the criminal intention of absconding
and in furtherance thereof made use of some device, trick
or false pretense in order to obtain possession-if, in other
words, the wrong-doer was guilty of common-law larceny
-then, according to the weight of authority, the owner can
recover, the property free of the lien.3 Briefly, it is said,
'Paterson v. Tash, 2 Strange 1178, 93 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1743) ; Williams v.
Barton, 3 Bing. 139, 130 Eng. Rep. 466 (1825) ; Phillips v. Huth, 6 M. & W.
572, 596, 151 Eng. Rep. 540, 550 (1840); Allen v. St. Louis National Bank,
120 U. S. 20, 7 Sup. Ct. 460 (1886); Kinder v. Shaw, 2 Mass. 398 (1807);
Bonito v. Mosquera, 2 Bosw. 401, 427 (N. Y. 1858).
-'Michigan State Bank v. Gardner, 15 Gray (81 Mass.) 362 (1860); Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521 (1862).
See cases in notes 18-25, 28, 30 infra.
The English cases are treated at length by HENRY G. PURCHASE in THE
LAW RELATING TO DOCUMENTS OF TITLE To GOODS (1931) 107 and ff., 200 and
ff. See, also, BENJAMIN, SALES (7th ed. 1931) 39, 40, 47, which briefly discusses the doubtful state of the English law.
But generally the subject has been ignored by the text writers. It is not
discussed at all in BLACKWELL, LAW RELATING TO FACTORS (1897).
. BURDICK, SALES (3rd ed. 1913) 225, 317, 318, cites a few American, but no
English, cases, and does not emphasize the element of common law larceny. In
2 CLARK AND SxYLEs, LAW OF AGENCY (1905) 1775 it is stated that the Factors
Act is no protection when consent has been obtained by fraud, and in JONES,
COLLATERAL SECURITIES (3d ed. 1912) §338, p. 411, that common law larceny
prevents the application of the Act. MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §2512,
p. 2118, has only a meagre footnote.
In POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW (1888)
although the neutralization of consent is considered (pp. 218-220), there is no
reference to the Factors Act.
WILLISTON, ON SALES (2d ed. 1924) at p. 745, makes the general statement
that under the English Law of 1889 (see note 27 infra) a pledgee is protected
although the pledgor was guilty of larceny by trick, but does not discuss any
of the authorities. He cites two cases, one, Oppenheimer v. Attenborough,
[1907] 1 K. B. 510, aff'd, [1908], 1 K. B. 221, which discusses but does not
decide the effect of larceny, and the other, Oppenheimer v. Frazer, 1 K. B.
519 (1907), which had been reversed in the Court of Appeal (see note 30 infra).
In discussing American Factors Acts the subject of common law larceny is not
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common-law larceny prevents the Factors Act from having
application.
This result has to some seemed destructive of the benefits conferred by the Factors Act. And in one recent case
a philanthropic institution engaged in the pawnbrokerage
business made strenuous, but vain, efforts to induce the
Court of Appeals of New York to change the established
rule. 4 In England, on the other hand, the courts have in
recent years expressed dissatisfaction with the general rule
as above stated., It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the various Factors Acts and the development of the
doctrine.
As has already been observed, at common law a person
having possession of merchandise with the right to sell it
could not create a valid lien by pledging it; nor, of course,
could a person pass good title if he had merely a power to
pledge." Restrictions such as these hampered trade. In
1824, therefore, England adopted the first somewhat limited Factors Act which was soon broadened by later enactments. 7 These laws provided in substance that when an
owner of goods entrusted an agent or factor with possession of the goods for purposes of sale or as security for advances the factor would be deemed the owner in his dealings
with strangers who relied in good faith upon his possession.
Acts similar to this were adopted in New York in 1830 8
and in Massachusetts in 1845. 9
mentioned, but it is stated (p. 748) that in New York a factor is within the
Act, although he procure the goods by fraud, citing two cases which so hold
only because the fraud did not amount to common law larceny. Thompson v.
Goldstone, 171 App. Div. 666, 157 N. Y. Supp. 621 (2d Dept. 1916) ; Shenfield
v. Bradley, 174 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1919). Williston does, however, state that
the Massachusetts law is otherwise (see note 25, infra).
See infra pp. 210, 211 and notes 22-24, infra.
See infra pp. 212, 213 and notes 29-34, infra.
8 See note 1, supra.
74 Geo. 4, c. 83 (1824);
6 Geo. 4, c. 94 (1825). In 1842 Parliament
adopted 5 and 6 Vict., c. 39, to overcome narrow interpretations of the earlier
law made by the courts in Phillips v. Huth, 6 M. & W. 572, 151 Eng. Rep. 540
(1840) and in Hatfield v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 647, 152 Eng. Rep. 273 (1842),
later affirmed in House of Lords, 14 M. & W. 665, 153 Eng. Rep. 642 (1845).
'Laws of 1830, c. 179, §§3-6, now, as amended by Laws of 1915, c. 273,
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW, §43.
' Stat. 1845, c. 193, extended by Stat. 1849, c. 216, and now Gen. Laws
(1921) c. 104.
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Some of the decisions construing these acts pointed out
that, if possession had been obtained by common-law larceny, the Act had no application since there was no voluntary entrustment by the owner. 10 That conclusion is obvious where the taking from the owner was by forcible act
-the original larceny of the common law.
There had developed another variety of common-law
larceny, however, known as larceny by trick or device. This
crime arose when the possession of property was obtained
by means of false representations or other fraudulent measures under circumstances justifying the inference that the
wrong-doer had formed the intention of converting the property to his own use at the time he obtained possession."
This was a crime which depended upon the fact that possession, but not title, was intended to be given by the owner.'2
It was inconsistent with the theory of the common law that
there should be a larceny where the owner intended to pass
title.
Later, however, acts which sought to obtain ownership
of property by various fraudulent means were prohibited
and this crime came to be known as larceny by false pretenses. 13 It was also made criminal to convert to one's

10See

Kinsey v. Leggett, 71 N. Y. 387 (1877) and cases cited in note 18,

infra.
2 2 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §§808-813.

Some of the early

cases are discussed in The Florence Sewing Machine Co. v. Warford, 1 Sweeny
433, at pp. 444-450 (31 N. Y. Super. 1869). Interesting examples of later
cases are: Queen v. Buckmaster, 20 Q. B. D. 182 (1887); Queen v. Russett,
[1892] 2 Q. B. 312; see, also, Lake v. Simmons, A. C. 487, 503 (1927); Com.
v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325 (1878) ; Weyman v. People, 4 Hun 511 (N. Y. 1875),
aff'd, on opinion below, 62 N. Y. 632 (1875); Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111
(1873); Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876); People v. Miller, 169 N. Y.
339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902).
2Rex v. Harvey, 1 Leach 467, 168 Eng. Rep. 335 (1787) ; Ross v. People,
5 Hill 294 (N. Y. 1843); Zink v. People, 77 N. Y. 114 (1879); People v.
Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887) ; People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355,
155 N. E. 670 (1927) ; see, Queen v. Buckmaster, 20 Q. B. D. 182 (1887) ; Com.
v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325 (1878), and Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387 (1871).
" A limited statute is 33 Hen. 8 (1542) c. 1, §§1, 2. This forms part of
the common law of the American states (see 2 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW, 8th ed.

1892, §141). More extensive statutes of England are: 30 Geo. 2 (1757) c. 245,
§1; 52 Ge6. 3 (1812) c. 64, §1; 7 and 8 Geo. 4 (1827) c. 29, §53; and 24 and 25
Vict. (1861) c. 96, §88.
In Massachusetts similar legislation was enacted at various times and is
now Gen. Laws (1921) c. 266, §§30-34 (see also c. 277, §41). In New York
the earliest law was 1 R. L. 410 (1813) §XIII, broadened in 2 R. S. 677 (1829)
§§53, 54, and now part of N. Y. PENAL LAW §1290.
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own uses property lawfully obtained, a crime generally
Known as embezzlement, 14 although in many modern codes
it also is classified as larceny. Unfortunately, the labels
"larceny by trick" and "larceny by false pretenses" have
led some jurists 15 to suppose that the distinction between
the two crimes rested on the nature of the fraud, that is,
that the labels were actually descriptive, ignoring the historical development of the subject and the arbitrary character of the nomenclature.
Even before the passage of the Factors Acts it was held
that an agent with power to sell could not convey title if
the property had been obtained feloniously; that is, under
circumstances amounting to common-law larceny ;16 but that
if title as well as possession was passed to the wrong-doer,
he could convey good title to a stranger.'1 What was under
discussion was necessarily a larceny by trick or device, since
there had never been any doubt at common law that title
could not be lost by a forcible larceny. In other words,
early in the nineteenth century the distinction was already
accepted which, despite the adoption of the Factors Acts,
has remained unchanged except, perhaps, in England.
In New York the rule has been consistently adhered
to.'
It was most expressly formulated by Judge Earl in
"1The earliest English law is 21 Hen. 8 (1530) c. 7, which was limited to
servants, and incorporated into the common law (see 2 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW,
8th ed. 1892, §320). Another limited statute was adopted in 1799: 39 Geo. 3,
c. 85. It was much broadened by 7 and 8 Geo. 4 (1827) c. 29, §47, and by 24
and 25 Vict. (1861) c. 96, §68.
In Massachusetts the earliest law was adopted in 1783, c. 53, §1. It was
extended at various times and is now Gen. Laws (1921) c. 266, §§50-59, as
amended by Acts of 1922, c. 313 (see also c. 277, §41).
In New York the earliest law was adopted in 1788 (1 R. L. 112) and was
finally enlarged as 2 R. S. 678 (1829) §59 (see People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend.
147 [N. Y. 1836]). Embezzlement is now defined as larceny under N. Y. PENAL
LAW §1290.

The conflicting decisions and resultant confusion are discussed in a note,
Larceny, Embezzlement and Obtaining Property by False Pretenses (1920)
20 CoL. L. Rxv. 318. The distinction is Well stated in Com. v. Barry, 124 Mass.
325 (1878). While in most jurisdictions modern statutes have abolished the
distinction between the various crimes certain relics remain. See' People v.
Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927).
"'Mowry v. Walsh, 8 Cowen 238 (N. Y. 1828).
" Ibid.

"Collins v. Ralli, 20 Hun 246 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd on opinion below, 85
N. Y. 637 (1881) ; Hentz v. Miller, 94 N. Y. 64 (1883) and cases cited infra
notes 19-22.
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1890 in Soltau v. Gerdau.19 In that case cotton was obtained by fraud for the alleged purpose of delivering it under
a previously consummated sale which was in fact fictitious.
The court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the
ground that the wrong-doer had obtained the property by
larceny, wherefore the Factors Act constituted no protection to defendant who had advanced money on the security
of warehouse receipts obtained by the wrong-doer without
the plaintiff's knowledge. It was urged on appeal that the
Factors Act was a protection to defendant because there
had been an entrustment to the agent and that the risk of
choosing a dishonest agent should fall on the owner. This
argument was rejected by a divided court. Judge Earl,
writing for the majority, said with reference to the Factors
Acts:
"Statutes similar to this have for many years
existed in England, and in most, if not all, the states
of the union, and it has never yet been held, nor, so
far as we can discover, claimed in any reported case
that the Factors Act can have any operation whatever in the case of goods taken by a common-law
larceny from the true owner. If the documents mentioned in the section quoted have been stolen from
the owner, then it cannot be said that the thief was
entrusted with their possession; and when a factor
or agent obtains goods from the true owner by a
common-law larceny, it cannot be said that he is entrusted with their possession for the purpose of sale.
To bring the case within the section quoted, the factor
or other agent must be consciously and voluntarily
entrusted with the possession of the documents or
merchandise, and the section can have no application
whatever to a case where the documents or goods
are taken by trespass or theft, and thus the possession of the factor or agent is, from the beginning,
tortious, wrongful and unlawful."
It should be noted that this case was also decided upon
the narrower ground that the wrong-doer was not entrusted
- 119 N. Y. 380, 23 N. E. 864 (1890).

210
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with possession for the purposes of sale, but merely for the
purposes of delivery; but the court expressly based its decision upon the dominating fact of larceny.
Some years later the question was squarely presented
and similarly decided, but without extended discussion. In
Schmidt v. Simpson 20 the owner of jewelry sued a pawnbroker who claimed the protection of the Factors Act on
the ground that the wrong-doer had a power of sale. Plaintiff contended first, that there were such limitations on the
power of sale as to prevent the Factors Act from having
application; second, that the wrong-doer had fraudulently
obtained possession with intent to convert the property and
so had committed larceny. The trial court ruled with plaintiff gn the first ground and refused to submit the larceny
question to the jury as immaterial. The Court of Appeals
held that error had been committed in both respects because no secret reservations could affect innocent purchasers
under the Factors Act and therefore plaintiff's second point
had become material. A new trial was accordingly ordered.
This rule has been generally accepted in the lower
courts of New York, although almost always merely as
dictum.2 1 In a recent case, however, the trial court awarded judgment to the owner of jewelry against a pawnbroker
on the sole ground that the wrong-doer had obtained possession by common-law larceny.22 In that case the fraud
claimed was a representation by the wrong-doer that he
wanted to show the articles to prospective customers when
in fact there were no such customers; criminal intent was
established from the immediate pawning of other articles
S204 N. Y. 434, 97 N. E. 966 (1912).
Phelps v. McQuade, 158 App. Div. 528, 143 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dept.
1913), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441 (1917) ; Thompson v. Goldstone, 171
App. Div. 666, 157 N. Y. Supp. 621 (2d Dept. 1916); Amols v. Bernstein, 214
App. Div. 649, 212 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dept. 1925); Sanett Corporation v.
Sanett Corporation of New England, 132 Misc. 455, 230 N. Y. Supp. 102
(1928).
However, there is an unreported case upholding judgment in favor of a
plaintiff on this ground: Rosenthal v. People's Collateral Pledge Society (App.
T., 1st Dept., March, 1915).
'Walter J. Stone, Inc. v. The Provident Loan Society of New York, 85
N. Y. L. 3. 897 (May 15, 1931), by Dore, J., in Trial Term, Part III. The
Court accordingly held that it was unnecessary to consider plaintiff's argument
that under Green v. Wachs, 254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930), no power of
sale had been given to the wrongdoer.
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obtained under similar circumstances at about the same
time. The defendant argued that the Factors Act should
be made applicable wherever the owner has chosen the agent
and regardless of whether there was a larceny by trick or
by false pretenses. The judgment was unanimously affirmed
without opinion in the Appellate Division, 23 and the Court

of Appeals, after granting permission 24to appeal, nevertheless likewise affirmed without opinion.
The subject appears to have been considered in only
one reported case in the United States outside of New York.
In H. A. Prentice Co. v. Page 25 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court followed the general rule in a case in which jewelry
was delivered to an agent for sale under conditional sale
contracts on his fraudulent representation that he had customers for the merchandise.
In England, however, there has been a reaction from
the doctrine. Under the original Factors Act there seems
to have been no difference of opinion. 26 In 1889 a change
was made in the language of the law; instead of speaking
of "agent entrusted" the reference is to the possession of
the agent "with the consent" of the owner.2 7 At first it
was not supposed that the change in the language produced
any change in result.2 8 Later, however, it was argued that
Parliament had intended changing the law, or, at least,
that the rule had originally been too broadly stated and that
s. c., 235 App. Div. 608 (1st Dept. 1932).
Ss. c., 260 N. Y. (Mem.) 30, - N. E. - (1932).
164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E. 279 (1895). But see Cairns v. Page, 165 Mass.
552, 43 N. E. 503 (1896) distinguishing the earlier case partly on the ground
that the agent in that case had power to make conditional sales only, and not
cash sales, but also on the ground that there was no proof in the later case of
any fraudulent representations at the time of taking. See also Decan v.
Shipper, 35 Pa. St. 239 (1860), which, without discussing the question of
larceny, reached the same conclusion on the authority of Kingsford v. Merry,
1 H. & N. 503, 156 Eng. Rep. 1299 (1856).
"'See Cole v. North Western Bank, L. R. 10 C. P. 354, 373 (1875), in
which Blackburn, J., cited as authority for his statement two cases, which,
however, do not refer at all to the Factors Act: Kingsford v. Merry, 1 H. &
N. 503, 156 Eng. Rep. 1299 (1856) and Hardman v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803,
158 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1863).
But in Sheppard v. Union Bank of London, 7 H. & N. 661, 158 Eng. Rep.
635 (1862) and in Baines v. Swainson, 4 B. & S. 270, 122 Eng. Rep. 460 (1863),
it was held, without discussion of common law larceny, that fraud would not
prevent the application of the Factors Act.
52 and 53 Vict., c. 45 (1889).
' Per Collins, L.J., Cahn v. Pockett's Bristoe Channel Steam Packet Company,.[1899] 1 Q. B. 643, 659.
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it was the nature of the fraud which should control, rather
than whether the fraud amounted to common-law larceny
or not. This argument was accepted at nisi prius in Oppenheimer v. Frazer29 but rejected by all three judges of the
Court of Appeal, 0 although two of them rested their decisions on the ground that defendants had not acted in good
faith and were therefore not entitled to the protection of
the Factors Act.
The presiding judge in that case, Sir Gorell Barnes,
said he did not think "consent" under the Factors Act could
exist where common-law larceny had been committed by the
wrong-doer in obtaining possession of the property; but he
recognized that there was a conflict in the decisions as to
what constituted larceny by trick. Fletcher-Moulton, L. J.,
was of the opinion that anything which negatived consent
in the eyes of the law negatived its existence for the purposes of the Factors Act. He also discussed the cases defining larceny by trick and concluded that the distinction
rested on the intention as to the passage of title. Kennedy,
L. J., agreed that consent was whatever the law recognized
as such but doubted whether in fact a common-law larceny
had been committed, because the wrong-doer had been given
31
power to pass title to the property to others.
Some years subsequent to this, a case arose in which
the question of what constituted common-law larceny was
discussed, but its effect upon the Factors Act ignored. The
action was for the recovery of a pearl necklace delivered
under a "sale or return" note, by plaintiffs, manufacturing
jewelers, to a dealer on his statement that he had a customer for it in the country. A few days after delivery the
dealer pawned the necklace with defendant. As the result
2 [1907] 1 K. B. 519. In this case the jury found that common law larceny
had been committed. Channel, J., however, concluded that this finding was
immaterial because the Factors Act protected defendant despite a larceny by
trick since the fraud relied on did not relate to the identity of the person to
whom possession had been delivered. In Oppenheimer v. Attenborough, [1907]
1 K. B. 510, aff'd, [1908] 1 K. B. 221, a case growing out of other acts of the
same wrongdoer, which was tried before Channel, J., at the same term, but
without a jury, he held that no larceny had been committed. The distinction
between the two cases rested on the sufficiency of the evidence that in obtaining
possession of the particular articles sought to be recovered the wrongdoer had
made fraudulent statements relied on by plaintiff.

Sos. c., [1907] 2 K. B. 50.
' But he cited no cases.
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of later negotiations plaintiffs, without knowledge of the
pawning, invoiced the necklace to the dealer and took his
notes for it. The jury found that the dealer had obtained
the necklace by fraud, intending to steal it, that it had been
understood title should not pass until plaintiffs had been
paid in cash and that defendant had not acted in good faith.
Judgment was therefore given for plaintiffs. This was reversed in the Court of Appeal 32 on the ground that defendant had, in fact, established his good faith, and that the
subsequent sale to the wrong-doer made it immaterial
whether or not the original transaction had been larcenous.
Two of the judges of the court expressed grave doubt as to
whether the transaction amounted to larceny by trick and
the third judge, Kennedy, L. J., definitely concluded that
because the owner intended to pass the property through
the wrong-doer, there had been no common-law larceny. 3 3
The Factors Act was not mentioned in any of the opinions.
The question again came before the Court of Appeal
in Folkes v. King.34 In that case plaintiff gave to a dealer
possession of his automobile, which was to be sold for not
less than a specified sum. The dealer, who was financially
involved, immediately sold the car for much less, having
done the same thing in other cases on at least fifty occasions. The car ultimately reached the possession of the defendant about whose good faith there was no question. The
trial court gave judgment for plaintiff on the ground that
possession had been obtained by common-law larceny so that
the Factors Act was no protection. 5 The Court of Appeal
reversed, partly on the ground that no larceny by trick had
in fact been committed because plaintiff had given the
wrong-doer power to pass title, 36 thus adopting as law the
Whitehorn v. Davison, [1911] 1 K. B. 463.
mKennedy, L. J., cited no authorities which reach the conclusion that a
power of sale protects the agent from conviction for larceny, or which even

discuss the point.
[1923] 1 K. B. 282.
[1922] 2 K. B. 348.

In reaching this result no judge of the Court of Appeal cited any case
which even discusses this point other than the Whitehorn case, note 32, supra.
Bankes, L. J., merely stated that if plaintiff intended to give the wrong-doer the
authority to pass the property to a purchaser then he "could not have been convicted of larceny" (293). In accord are: Lowther v. Harris, [1927] 1 K. B.
393 and Buller and Company, Ltd. v. T. J. Brooks, Inc., 35 Commercial C.
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dicta in the case last discussed.3 7 Bankes, L. J., however
(pp. 296-8), also discussed the question treated in this paper
and expressed the positive opinion that common-law larceny
would not prevent the Factors Act from applying to the
case, although he recognized that every member of the court
sitting in the Oppenheimer case 38 had rejected that view.
He said that for the purposes of the Factors Act it was the
mind of the owner and not the mind of the wrong-doer which
was to be looked into. In other words, the question was
not whether the wrong-doer had had the intention of converting the property when he received it, but only whether
the owner intended to part with possession. The judge
recognized, however, that there might be cases in which the
apparent consent of the owner was not a real consent, as
where the fraud related to the identity of the person to
whom the goods were delivered. Scrutton, L. J. (pp. 303-6),
agreed with this reasoning, saying further: "I do not think
Parliament had any intention of applying the artificial distinctions of the criminal law to a commercial transaction
defeating it if there were larceny by a trick, but not if there
was only larceny by a bailee, or possession obtained by false
pretenses." Eve, J.. agreed that there was no larceny "in
a civil proceeding"; but he did not discuss what effect larceny might have on the Factors Act.
A few years after the cases cited above the House of
Lords refused to pass upon the precise point where it was
unnecessary to the decision of the case then before it.
39
Viscount Sumner said in Lake v. Simmons:
"On the bearing, which apparent consent, obtained by a trick, may have on the 'consent' which is
mentioned in S. 2 of the Factors Act, 1889, there has
been so signal and so indecisive a conflict of author209 (1930). But in Heap v. Motorists Advisory Agency, Ltd., [1923] 1. K. B.
583, since the wrong-doer had no power to sell generally but only to a particular prospective purchaser who was, however, fictitious, Lush, J., refused to
follow the Folkes case and found that larceny by trick had been committed.
However, he held the Factors Act inapplicable not on the ground, but because
defendant had not acted in good faith and because the wrong-doer was not a
mercantile agent within the Act.
"' Supra note 32.
Supra note 30.
[1927] A. C. 487, 510.

LARCENY BY TRICK
itative opinion that I should be loath to offer any
conclusion of my own, unless it was quite clear that
the point was necessary to the decision of this case."
That was an action on an insurance policy which excepted from its provisions jewelry "entrusted" to a customer. The jewels were obtained by a woman's false representations that fictitious relatives desired to examine and
perhaps purchase them. The woman had authority only to
show and not to negotiate. In the lower court there had
been judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that larceny
by trick had been committed and on the ground that the
wrong-doer was not a customer. 40 This was reversed by a
divided Court.4 1 Bankes, L. J., and Warrington, L. J.,
agreed that the meaning of "entrustment" should not depend upon the distinctions of the criminal law since the
parties had in mind the intention of the assured rather than
the intention of the wrong-doer. Atkin, L. J., dissented on
the ground that since there had been a larceny by trick
there was no entrustment and in the House of Lords his
views were partially accepted, although the decision was
placed rather on the ground that the wrong-doer was no
customer than on the ground that there was no entrusting.
Viscount Sumner held that in determining what constituted consent in a commercial transaction the distinctions
of the criminal law could not be disregarded. But he stated
that in considering cases arising under the Factors Act it
might well be argued that "the original owner cannot deny
a consent which is not only apparent but is invested with
his appearance by what he has done" (p. 511).
None other of the law lords discussed this issue at all
with the exception of Lord Atkinson, who characterized the
transaction as larceny by trick and therefore outside the exception in the policy. Because of the limited authority given
to the wrong-doer in this case the distinction made by the
Court of Appeal in the earlier cases was not discussed.
,0[1926] 1 K. B. 366.
1 [1926] 2 K. B. 51.
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An English author 4 2 has recently formulated the dicta
of the Folkes case 43 in somewhat broader fashion: where
the fraud relates to collateral circumstances the Factors
Act protects the innocent third party, but not where the
fraud relates to the identity of the person 44 to whom the
owner gave possession or to the identity of the property delivered. 4 r This writer does not discuss the ruling that there
can be no conviction for larceny by trick where the wrong40
doer is given the power to pass title.

It is difficult to justify this modern rule of the English
Courts-one which does. not seem to have been as yet accepted in any reported criminal case-since it is clear that
the wrong-doer himself has not obtained title and therefore
the age-old difficulty of the common law is no impediment
to a conviction for larceny. It is, however, a convenient
way to avoid the decision of the question which has so much
troubled the judges-whether in any event such larceny
should have -any bearing on possession otherwise protected
by the Factors Act.
On this crucial subject the suggestion of Viscount
Sumner has perhaps considerable force-namely that the
owner should be estopped to deny his consent. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in so far as the third
party is concerned, it makes no difference whether the wrong
was a forcible larceny, a larceny by trick or a larceny by
false pretenses, or, indeed, embezzlement where possession
was delivered, not for purposes of sale, but for purposes
specifically excepted in some of the Factors Acts, as, for
example, for transportation. 47 In the first and last of those
cases it cannot be disputed that the original owner retains
his title. Modern business conditions have not yet required
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(1931) 203, 4.
"In fra note 34.
"Purchase cites Kingsford v. Merry, 1 H. & N. 503, 156 Eng. Rep. 1299

(1856); Hardman v. Hooth, 1 H. & C. 803, 158 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1863), and
Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. C. 459 (1878).
" Purchase cites Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375
(1864), and the Whitehorn case, note 32, supra, per Buckley, J., at 479. The
subject of identity of goods is not referred to by that judge, however, nor is
the subject of larceny discussed in the first case.
" Supra notes 32, 34, 36.
' See, for instance, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §43, subd. 4.

LARCENY BY TRICK

the extension to ordinary merchandise of the rules of the
law merchant developed as to negotiable instruments, although in recent years many jurisdictions have by statute
extended them to certificates .of stock.4 8 There are no logical considerations which demand the adoption of any particular rule. Historical considerations probably account
for the fact that larceny by trick has been associated with
larceny by force in the judicial mind. The distinction suggested in the recent English cases which makes the result
depend upon the nature of the fraud rather than its technical criminal character may well be justified logically on
the theory that only where the fraud relates to the identity
of the person or the property is the contract between seller
is no conand agent void, and, as Holmes has said, there
49
tract because there is really only one party.
Nevertheless it is not desirable that the courts modify
ancient rules for merely logical considerations. The confusion in the English cases shows the danger of departure
from familiar principles. It is probably wiser to leave to
the legislatures the task of correcting anachronisms and of
molding into greater harmony the slowly, haphazardly developed law which exists on this subject.
OSMOND K. FiRAENKEL.

New York City.
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See 6 U. L. A., 1931 Supp., p. 4, for list of such statutes.

"THE COMMON LAW (1881) 308, referred to by Viscount Haldane in Lake

v. Simmons, [1927] A. C. 487, 502. Holmes says, further, With reference to
void contracts: "Either there is no second party, or the two parties say different
things, or essential terms seemingly consistent are really inconsistent as used"
(315).

